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From the Archives
Economic Analysis and the Formulation of U.S. Climate Policy
Michael A. Toman
Discussion Paper 02-59
December 2003

13 + 1: A Comparison of Global Climate Change Policy Architectures
Joseph E Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert N. Stavins
Discussion Paper 03-26
August 2003

Combining Rate-Based and Cap-and-Trade Emissions Policies
Carolyn Fischer
Discussion Paper 03-32
May 2003

The Economics of
a Lost Deal

Jean-Charles Hourcade and Frederic Ghersi
Discussion Paper 01-48 December 2001

The Economics of "When" Flexibility in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies
Michael A. Toman, Richard D. Morgenstern, and John W. Anderson
Discussion Paper 99-38-REV, December 1998; Revised June 1999

Research Frontiers in the Economics of Climate Change
Michael A. Toman
Discussion Paper 98-32
April 1998



Home > Policy Design >
Emissions Targets

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change established a non-binding aim for industrialized countries of stabilizing their emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. The Kyoto Protocol built on this approach by setting binding emissions targets to a fraction of their 1990 levels over the 2008-2012 period. These represent examples of setting fixed quantitative emissions targets as the primary goals for near-term climate change policies while allowing countries the discretion to determine policies to meet these goals. (For a comparison of quantitative targets with price-based policies, see the Price vs. Quantity page.)  

In addition to setting fixed emissions targets based on some historical level, a variety of other approaches to emissions targets have received consideration by the international community. For example, a quantitative emissions target could be adjusted to account for economic growth.  Argentina proposed an emissions target in 1999 indexed to GDP growth, and the United States has adopted such a non-binding emissions-intensity goal in 2002.  Indexing an emissions target to economic growth can help address the uncertainties associated with the stringency of a target that reflects the unknowns in forecasting economic growth over a period of ten or more years.  Another alternative designed to promote participation by developing countries is the so-called “no lose” targets.  These would set a fixed quantitative emissions target for a country.  If that country abates emissions such that it has lower emissions than its target, then it can sell emissions allowances reflecting this difference to developed countries in the international tradable permit market.  If the country does not beat its quantitative target, then it faces no punitive enforcement. 

RFF researchers have contributed to the policy and academic debates on how to set quantitative emissions targets.  Two RFF scholars worked on the design of the Argentine and U.S. emissions targets indexed to economic growth (so-called intensity targets).  RFF researchers continue to work on target design, with a focus on how to set and implement targets in ways that minimize downside economic risks.

Featured Work on This Topic

 

Ray Kopp on E&E TV's OnPoint

Weathervane Feature | September 2007

Senior Fellow Ray Kopp shares insight into Congressional climate discussions and the prospects for economy-wide climate legislation.

     
 
Link to US Climate Mitigation in the context of Global Stabilization
 

U.S. Climate Mitigation in the Context of Global Stabilization

Richard G. Newell and Daniel Hall
Weathervane Backgrounder | May 2007

This Backgrounder examines recent studies of long-term stabilization scenarios to
understand whether and how near-term U.S. climate policy action can translate into long-term, environmentally significant climate outcomes.

     
 
 

Too Good to Be True? An Examination of Three Economic Assessments of California Climate Change Policy

Robert N. Stavins, Judson Jaffe, and Todd Schatzki

07-12 | March 2007

     
     
Link to Five Recent Senate Bills on Greenhouse GasLimits  

Comparison and Analysis: Five Recent Senate Bills

Ray Kopp and Billy Pizer
RFF Web Feature
February 2007

Senior Fellows Ray Kopp and Billy Pizer analyze Senate bills proposing mandatory GHG limits.

     
 
Link to Discussion Paper  

Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy

Joseph Kruger, Wallace E. Oates, and William A. Pizer

07-02 | February 2007

     
     
Emmissions Trading: Principles and Practice  

Emissions Trading: Principles and Practice,
2nd Edition

Thomas H. Tietenberg

The second edition of one of the most widely cited works in the tradable permits literature, Emissions Trading offers a comprehensive overview of what we have learned about this important environmental policy instrument after twenty-five years of theory, practice, and research.

     
 
 

Climate Policy Design Under Uncertainty

William A. Pizer

Discussion Paper 05-44
October 2005

Fellow Billy Pizer argues that intensity-based targets and a price-based safety valve can lessen the downside of emissions caps.

     
     
 

Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Change and Renewable Energy

Carolyn Fischer and Richard G. Newell

Discussion Paper 04-05, April 2004
Revised June 2005

Some of the most popular ways for supporting renewable energy are the least efficient at reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The most efficient way is also the least popular, setting out a dilemma for policymakers.

     
 

 

The Case for Intensity Targets

William A. Pizer

Discussion Paper 05-02REV, February 2005

Revised November 2005

For at least the next two decades greenhouse gases will continue to rise. Fellow Billy Pizer suggests it is necessary to accommodate this rise while putting into place the policies that, tightened over time, are capable of slowing the rise, then stopping it and forcing a decline.

     
 

Link to Discussion Paper  

Near-Term Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets

Raymond J. Kopp

Discussion Paper 04-41
November 2004

Senior Fellow Ray Kopp suggests feasible ways for the U.S. to curb climate-warming gases over time. Such actions could produce global benefits without severe consequences to the economy.

     
 

 

Project-Based Mechanisms for Emissions Reductions: Balancing Trade-offs with Baselines

Carolyn Fischer

Discussion Paper 04-32
August 2004

     
 

 

Can an Effective Global Climate Treaty Be Based on Sound Science, Rational Economics, and Pragmatic Politics?

Robert N. Stavins

Discussion Paper 04-28
May 2004

     

 

 

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